GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS AND THE BANKRUPTCY LAW by HAGAR, MARSHALL S.
GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS AND THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW
MARSHALL S. HAGAR
of the New York Bar
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the English Bankrupt Acts and our own Acts of 1841 and
1867, a general assignment made by a debtor for the benefit of
creditors was held almost uniformly to be an act of bankruptcy and
a constructive fraud upon the bankruptcy law. This was true whether
the assignment was made with or without preference, for the benefit
of all or of only some of the creditors, and without regard to the
debtor's actual intent in making it. It was considered an attempt on
his part to defeat the operation of the bankruptcy statute by select-
ing his own .administrator and the forum in which his estate was to
be administered, with the preconceived purpose of securing to himself
greater lenity and advantage through such administration, and the
avoidance of the more stringent regulations of the bankruptcy courts;
and thus it was deemed an attempt to hinder and delay his creditors."
It was even held 'by the late eminent jurist, William J. Wallace, when
district judge in the Northern District of New York, that under the
Act of 1867, such an assignment was an act of bankruptcy which
would defeat a -discharge, irrespective of the time when it was made,
and although made without preference.' The assignee for the bene-
fit of creditors, as a participant in such attempted fraud upon our
earlier Acts, was held to strict accountability in respect to his dis-
position of the debtor's estate and his own expenditures, and was often
refused compensation because of his connection with the common-law
assignment.
Our present bankruptcy law provides in express words, among the
enumeration of the acts of bankruptcy, that one of such acts shall
consist in the debtor's having made a general assignment for the bene-
fit of his creditors.3 To constitute such an act of bankruptcy, there
".Jones v. Sleeper (1843) Fed. Cas. No. 7,496 (Act of 1841); MacDonald v.
Moore (1876) Fed. Cas. No. 8,763 (Act of 1867); Globe Ins. Co. v. Clevieland
Ins. Co. (1876) 14 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 31, decision by Judge Blatchford (N. Y.),
reversed on other grounds by Circuit Court of Appeals; Platt v. Preston (1879)
Fed. Cas. No. 33,2r9. See Mayer v. Hellman (1875) 91 U. S. 496, 502; In re.
Biesenthal (i877) Fed. Cas. No. x,236.
'In re Kasson (1878) I8 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 379.
* Bankruptcy Act, July 1, i898, c. .4, s. 3 (4).
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need be no formal deed of assignment,4 nor need the assignment
necessarily be valid under the state law; and the assignment may be
joined with an application for voluntary dissolution of a corporation
in the state court. The term "general assignment" may be construed
in a generic sense." It has also been held that after a general assign-
ment is made, the act of bankruptcy is complete, and insolvency is not
a defense to a bankruptcy petition, nor need it be alleged or proved.6
Although the making of a general assignment is no longer a ground
for denying the bankrupt a discharge, the general principles and
decisions affecting such general assignments under our former statutes
in their relations to subsequent bankruptcy are as applicable under the
present act as before"
II. PARAMOUNT JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
The Constitution of the United States expressly confers upon
Congress power to make uniform bankruptcy laws throughout the
states."
"The plenary and paramount power of congress to establish uni-
form laws.on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States,
is given in express terms by the constitution of the United States. It
is therefore very clear that when congress has exercised the power thus
conferred their action must necessarily control or limit the exercise
of the power of the states over the same subject matter; and that
wh uever any state legislation, or any action of the state courts, comes
practically into actual conflict with the proper execution of the laws
of congress, constitutionally passed under such grant of power, state
legislation and the jurisdiction and action of the state courts must
yield to the paramount authority of the national government. This
being so it is unnecessary in this case to decide that the insolvent laws
are superseded ipso facto by the bankrupt act."
This jurisdiction, though paramount, controlling and exclusive
when properly invoked within the limited time, does not have the
effect of repealing the state insolvency laws, but merely suspends
'In re C. H. Bennett Shoe Co. (i9o5) I40 Fed. 687; Courtenay Mereantile
Co. v. Finch (i9i2) 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 688; Griflin v. Dutton (i9o8) 165
Fed. 626.
'In re Thomlinson Co. (907) 154 Fed. 8 34, 835.
'Gill v. Farmers' & Manufacturers' Bank (9,5) 35 Am. Bankr. Rep. 91;
In re Farthing (1913) 202 Fed. 557.
'This was declared in the noteworthy and exhaustive opinion of Judge
Addison Brown of the Southern District of New York. In re Gutwillig (1898)
I Am. Bankr. Rep. 78, aff'd id. 388. It was Judge Brown's privilege to determine
many important and far-reaching questions arising in the first years of the
operation of the present Bankruptcy Act; his opinions still stand illuminative
of the subject and are often quoted and reiterated by the higher courts.
"In re Safe Deposit & Savings Institution (1872) 7 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 393, 398.
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them pro tanto. Provisions of state statutes remain unaffected and
controlling where bankruptcy does not intervene, and in some cases,
even after such bankruptcy, as, for example, in respect to matters
not comprised within the scope of the act.9
On the other hand,
"the rights of creditors, inchoate from the making of the assignment,
ripen into maturity when the adjudication is made. If it were other-
wise the bankruptcy law could be evaded with the utmost facility."1
This being so, in such cases the assignee is not to be regarded, con-
cerning matters occurring or transpiring after the filing of the petition,
as an adverse claimant with any claim of right in himself or as an
assignee for value, but as the agent for the debtor in the distribution
of the estate.1"
Upon an adjudication and the appointment and qualification of a
trustee in bankruptcy, the title of the trustee to property in the hands
of the assignee reverts to the date of the filing of the petition; all the
trustee's rights and remedies are fixed as of that date, and the bank-
ruptcy court has jurisdiction summarily to order such property
delivered to the trustee, and to set aside a sale -previously made by the
assignee under certain circumstances and within the four months
period.12 Payments made by the assignee in apparent good faith may
be recovered for the estate, and even a purchaser from an assignee may
acquire no title as against the trustee in bankruptcy. 8 Immediately
after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the federal court has power to
enjoin the assignee from proceeding further with the subject of his
assignment, or to appoint a .receiver in bankruptcy; or in its discretion
it may permit the assigned property to remain in the hands of the
assignee pending the appointment of a trustee or other disposition of
the estate.
III. HISTORY OF ASSIGNMENTS SINCE THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF
1898 wENT INTO EFFECT
Have our courts acted consistently in recognizing such paramount
power of the federal courts? It would appear not if one closely
'In re Watts & Sachs (8903) 190 U. S. I; In re Gray (19oo) 3 Am. Bankr.
Rep. 647.
"In re Knight (i9o3) 125 Fed. 35,.40. See Johnson v. Crawford & Yothers
(igoz7) i54 Fed. 761, aff'd id. 769; Geo. M. West Co. v. Lea Bros. (I899) 174
U. S. 590.
'Bryan v. Bernheimer (190i) 181 U. S. 188; Whittlesey v. Becker & Co.
(1911) 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 672.
'In re Knight (19o3) 125 Fed. 35; In re Karp (915) 36 Am. Bankr. Rep. 414.
'Stearns v. Flick (igoo) 1O3 Fed. 919; In re Knight, supra; In re Carver &
Co. (19o2) 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 539.
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observe the judicial attitude over a course of years. In the early
years of administration under the Act of 1898, the making of general
assignments by debtors was so generally frowned upon by the federal
courts, following the trend of decisions under former acts, that it
fell into general disuse. The assignment bureaus of the state courts
became to a large extent deserted. Insolvency laws remained in most
states upon the statute books, but few thought seriously of making
a general assignment except as an easy step into a bankruptcy con-
sidered inevitable. In assignment cases the federal courts in most
jurisdictions appointed bankruptcy receivers ex parte, with systematic
regularity and without much scrutiny of the applications presented.
It was enough that an assignment had been made and that an assignee
was administering the estate, which, by every established principle" of
the Bankruptcy Act, Congress had intended to be administered under
the exclusive authority of the federal courts. No thought was given
to the personiality or qualifications of the assignee, be he ever so
eminently fitted to administer the estate, except that in rare cases he
was named as receiver in the bankruptcy proceedings. Such was the
modus operandi of the federal courts down to the end of the year
i909 or the beginning of i9io, and throughout these years voluntary
bankruptcy was not allowed to corporations.1 ' Meanwhile the
expenses of bankruptcy receiverships multiplied and grew to abnormal
amounts. Many complaints began to be heard as to the extreme cost
of administering insolvent estates under this system and some reforms
were projected, particularly in the Southern District of New York.
In December, i9o9, the Circuit Court of Appeals for- the Second
Circuit handed down a decision in the matter of the Oakland Lumber
Co.,15 which was taken-mistakenly, it now appears-as establishing
a new rule relating to assignments, and as restoring them once more
to respectability. In the Oakland Co. case the court said:
"The question broadly stated, is this-should the court have vacated
the ex parte order appointing the receiver?
"At the time this motion was made the questions presented by the
creditors' petition and the bankrupt's answer were undetermined, and,
so far as this record discloses, there was nothing to indicate that the
assignee under the state law was not an honest, capable and respon-
sible man, in whose hands the property was entirely safe.
"The power to take from a man his property, without giving him an
opportunity to be heard, is both arbitrary and drastic and should not
be exercised except in the clearest cases. Congress recognized the
necessity for caution by limiting the appointment of receivers to cases
"By the amendment of igio corporations were permitted to become voluntary
bankrupts, except municipal, railroad, insurance and banking corporations.
"In re Oakland Lumber Co. (igog) x74 Fed. 634, referring therein to an
earlier decision of the same court, In re Spalding (i9o5, C. C. A. 2d) 139
Fed. 244.
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where it is 'absolutely necessary' for the preservation of the estate.
In other words, the reason for such an interference with the rights
of property must be clear, pogitive and certain. Of course cases fre-
quently arise where this remedy may be necessary--cases where there
is reason to believe that the property may be stolen, or secreted or
turned over to favored creditors. But fraud cannot be presumed,
neither can danger to the property be predicated of acts which are
honest and lawful. It cannot be presumed that an assignee under
a state law intends to plunder the fund he is appointed to admin-
ister. Unless something be shown to the contrary the presumption
is persuasive that during the. interval between the filing of the petition
and the appointment of a trustee, the property will be entirely safe in
the hands of the assignee, especially if he be enjoined from disposing
of it pendente lite."
While upon examination of this case we find that it does but reiterate
general and well-established principles of law which should govern
the drastic remedy of receiverships, nevertheless the effect of the
decision was almost revolutionary. The decision was apparently taken
as establishing a general rule in favor of the retention of assignees
and receivers appointed in the state court. It was thought to mean,
generally speaking, that in no case should they thereafter, on the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy, be removed or superseded by a receiver
appointed in such bankruptcy proceedings without actual proof of
fraud, misconduct or incompetency. Motions for the appointment
of receivers in the district courts upon estates in the hands of
assignees were denied with such frequency and uniformity that soon
such motions almost ceased to be made. Many other restrictive rules
were made as to the employment of the attorney for the petitioning
creditors, as to the amount of compensation, etc., all tending to dis-
courage attorneys seeking to invoke the aid of the federal courts in
administering the estates of insolvents. These rulings soon drove the
Bar and the commercial community to the opposite extreme. Only
infrequent efforts were made to prevent assignees from administering
estates in the state courts untrammelled, without fear of interference,
and in the face of the bankruptcy law whose only utility under the
circumstances might be to afford the debtor a discharge from his
debts without the concomitant administration and investigation prior
to the appointment of the trustee. In consequence of this attitude
and of the interpretation of the Oakland Lumber Co. decision, the
assignment business of the state courts increased enormously.
As stated recently in the public press of New York City, summing
up statistics of assignments, in the year 191o in New York County
there were seventy-seven general assignments; in 1911 one hundred
and nine; in 1912 one hundred and ninety-eight; in 1913 two hundred
and forty-nine; in 1914 nine hundred and twenty-four, and in 1915
more than eleven hundred; while the number of assignments made
in the county when the decision above referred to was written was
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trifling. In 1916 the number of corporations alone making assignments
was two hundred and sixty-two.'
Abuses and evils arising from this double administration of the
same subject-matter by state and federal courts became prevalent:
assignees in some instances administered and distributed estates with-
out even filing the bond required by state statute, sold property
after the entry of the order of adjudication and without appraisal,
made exorbitant payments to their attorneys, and succeeded, in some
instances, in having their accounts passed and allowances fixed in the
state courts even over the trustee's objection. Recently the federal
courts, taking full cognizance of this unsavory state of affairs and
the resulting loss to creditors, have been endeavoring to rectify and
curb such evils. In 1916, in the matter of the Federal Mail & Express
Co.,1 7 in the Southern District of New York, the court discussed these
matters very explicitly in its opinion and stated as its conclusion that
the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Oakland Lumber
Co. case was not meant to interpose a jurisdictional objection to
"As to the methods employed in some of these assignment cases, consider-
able light is thrown by the record of a proceeding which the writer recently had
occasion to examine in one of our district courts which may be taken, perhaps,
as somewhat typical of many of the cases. In this particular case the attorney
for the insolvent appeared with his client at the office of another attorney, a
business acquaintance, and stated that his client desired to make a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors to the latter attorney; and upon con-
sent of this attorney, the assignment was made to him about four o'clock in
the afternoon. Another attorney on a different floor in the same building was
called up on the telephone by the assignee and told of the general assignment
This attorney with great expedition called at the office of the assignee, looked
over the list of creditors, and was enabled by ten o'clock the following morn-
ing to file a petition in bankruptcy against the debtor upon three claims, all
assigned to clerks in his own office. Immediately thereafter the assignee
retained the lawyer acting as attorney for the petitioning creditors as his
attorney also. While the assignee was on the stand in the bankruptcy proceeding,
the following interesting colloquy took place:
"I anticipated that if any of Mr. 's clients were interested in this
assigned business, that a petition would be filed. Q. Was anything said about
that between you and Mr. ? A. The only thing that was said was,
when I told him that I am assignee, he asked me, 'whether any of his clients
were interested in the assignment' I said 'look them over; I don't know.'
I simply anticipated that he asked that question for the purpose of filing peti-
tion in bankruptcy; because he usually does. Q. What do you mean? A.
What do I mean? That if any attorney who represents creditors sees that an
assignment forthe benefit of creditors is made, it is his duty to creditors to
file a petition in bankruptcy. Q. Yes, but as I understand it, Mr.
represents you 'as assignee? A. Yes, I told you I asked him to represent me
in this as assignee, of course. . . . Q. When was the first assignment for
benefit of creditors made to you? Do you remember? A. A week after the
custom was established. Q. When was that? A. Oh, I don't know, about two
or three weeks after Judge would not permit the receiver to retain
counsel. Q. How many assignments, have been made to you since that time,
approximately? A. May I ask my clerk? Of course I cannot tell but there
are fifty, perhaps one hundred. I think it is nearer one hundred, I don't want
to be bound by this answer. . .
" (1916) 37 Am. Bankr. Rep. 240.
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the general appointment of receivers when assignees were in charge,
but was intended for that particular case. The district judge con-
cluded by observing that he would be inclined to grant stays against,
assignees in case of future assignments, unless the creditors should
as a body desire otherwise. This was followed by Judge Mayer in
In re D. & E. Dress Co., Inc., who remarked very pertinently ;:s
"An exceedingly annoying practice has developed by which, after
the making of the general assignment, this court [Bankruptcy Court]
is nevertheless appealed to either by the assignee or by creditors to
assist in the speedy administration of the estate, which often is both
necessary and important in connection with summary proceedings, by
landlords, sales of perishable property, examinations and the like ...
"I may also add that there may, of course, be cases where the
selection of an assignee at a meeting of reliable creditors may be
had under circumstances practically equivalent to the election of a
trustee, but, reserving the discretion which may be necessary for exer-
cise 'in any given case, I announce the general policy of removing
assignees and appointing receivers in their stead, quite irrespective
of the good. faith and standing of the assignee. This I think is the
only means whereby the -Bankruptcy Act can be carried out in
accordance with its intent and spirit."
Through the concerted efforts of credit men of. large commercial
houses and attorneys practicing in bankruptcy, an attempt was recently
made by Congress to have enacted certain amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act whereby it should be obligatory upon the federal courts
to take jurisdiction of the administration of assigned estates imme-
diately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In the press of
more important matters, the amendment failed of passage, but it is
to be hoped it will be taken up and considered at the next session of
Congress.
IV. IN WHAT COURT ASSIGNEE SHOULD ACCOUNT
Owing to the early decisions of the Supreme Court in Louisville
Trust Co v. Comingorg and Mueller v. Nugent" the impression has
prevailed that it was a matter of discretion on the part of the assignee
whether he should account in the federal court or in the court which
appointed him, and many of the cases in the books turn upon the point
whether an, assignee, having consented to come within the federal
jurisdiction for the purpose of having his accounts passed, is bound
by the summary order of such court in the matter of turning over
assets, of recovering payments previously made by the assignee and
disallowed, aid in the surcharge of the assignee generally, by reason
18 (July 5th, 1916) N. Y. LAW J.
1' (1902) 184 U. S. 18.
' (Igo2) 184 U. S. i. See also Bryan v. Bernheimer (IOI)" I8I 'U. S. IM.
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of his misconduct in administering the assigned estate. For example,
in the case of the Banzai Mfg. Co.,21 the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit considered an order made by the court below, that
the assignee summarily turn over to the trustee several thousand
dollars, much of which had been improvidently expended by the
assignee and with which, for that reason, he had been surcharged.
The court said:
"By reason of his [the assignee's] improvident conduct in so doing
it has been found that he ought to make good to the estate the whole
or the greater part of these disbursements, and he is a debtor to the
estate for that amofint, but it does not necessarily follow that his
indebtedness is of such a sort that he may be imprisoned for non-
payment. The situation differs from that which has frequently come
before the courts where a person-the bankrupt or some one else-
has had property of the estate in his possession and testifies that
he had paid it out or distributed it in some way, but the referee and
the district judge have disbelieved his testimony and have ordered him
to return the property or be imprisoned for disobedience to such order.
It is not understood that in the case at bar the trustee disputes the state-
ment of [the assignee] that he actually dild pay out the money, or
substantially all of it. More would be, required than appears in this
record to warrant an order punishing [the assignee] for failure to pay
$6,053.27 which he owes the estate as a result of his transactions while
assignee."
This entire matter of jurisdiction to settle an assignee's accounts
has recently come before the courts in the matter of Louis Neuburger,
Inc.,22 wherein an assignee filed his report and accounts in the Bronx
County Court, New York, and an order was entered passing and
approving such accounts over the trustee's objection. The assignee
thereupon served upon the trustee in bankruptcy a copy of the order
passing his accounts, and paid over a check for the monies payable to
the trustee, pursuant to the order. Subsequently the referee in bank-
ruptcy, upon the application of the trustee, directed the assignee to
file his report and accounts as assignee in the United States District
Court on or before a certain date. The assignee refused to comply
with this order; his application for a review of the order was heard
and denied, the district judge overruling the contention of the assignee
that he had a right to account only in the state court, whence he
derived his authority. The court held that the trustee had the power
to compel an accounting in the federal court, and that the state court
having been ousted in its jurisdiction, the accounting order of the state
court was not binding upon the trustee as res adjudicata. The Circuit
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, with opinion by Judge Rogers,
(i91o) 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 497, 5oi.
(x96) 37 Am. Bankr. Rep. 248, aff'd (97) 39 Am. Bankr. Rep. x39.
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affirmed the court below and held that it was the plain duty of the
assignee to account in the bankruptcy court for the estate which came
into his hands as assignee.
V. COMPENSATION OF ASSIGNEE AND HIS ATTORNEY IN THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT
It was formerly held in many jurisdictions23 that an assignee's
claim for compensation for his services must, when bankruptcy has
intervened, be disallowed, upon the theory that the assignee by his
acceptance of the assignment voluntarily makes himself a party to an
arrangement contrary to the policy of Congress in enacting a uniform
bankruptcy law, and that assignees should go unrewarded even when
they have acted honestly and intelligently and in all probability the
estate has benefited by their experience and efforts. This harsh rule
was soon modified, however, and it is now quite generally held that an
assignee should be treated, upon the settlement of his account, as a
quasi-receiver and be compensated, together with his attorney, for
whatever services are shown to have been of actual benefit in pre-
serving the estate while in his possession. To be denied compensa-
tion he must have been guilty of actual fraud, waste or negligent
conduct. His claim, however, is not entitled to be paid as a first lien
or claim in the bankruptcy courts out of the estate in the hands of
trustee; nor can there be any deduction for services rendered by the
assignee prior to the assignment or for expenses made in attempting
to resist an adjudication in bankruptcy.2' As to disbursements made
prior to the four months preceding bankruptcy, the Supreme Court
has held that in such cases the assignee is an adverse claimant and
such disbursements cannot be recovered in. summary proceedings. 25
VI. DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF ASSIGNEES IN RELATION TO
INSOLVENT'S ESTATE
While Congress has not, by enacting a uniform bankruptcy system,
succeeded, it seems, in outlawing the state insolvency laws, neverthe-
less it has made it incumbent oil a state court assignee to act with
the utmost good faith and sound business judgment in administering
his trust, if he is to avoid liability. He win be held to have acted on
notice and at his peril in carrying on the bankrupt's business, in selling
"In re Pauly (1899) 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 333; In re Kingman (1899) 5 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 251; In re Peter Paul Book Co. (1900) 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. io5;
In re Harson Co. (I9o4) II Am. Bankr. Rep. 514; Wilbur v. Watson (1901) 7
Am. Bankr. Rep. 54.
uIn re Hays (igio) 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 691.
=Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor (192) 184 U. S. I8; Randolph v. Scruggs
(igo3) io Am. Bankr. Rep. I; In re Zier & Co. (i9o5) z5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 646.
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it out, or in making expenditures. He may be surcharged for result-
ing losses or for doing anything beyond what was necessary to pre-
serve the property which was in his hands when the petition was filed.
Under ordinary circumstances it is his duty to turn this over intact
to the trustee in bankruptcy.28
"2In re Karp (ig5) 36 Am. Bankr. Rep. 414; In re Sobol (915) 35 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 8o4; In re Resnek (917) 38 Am. Bankr. Rep. 759; In re Hays
(igio) x8i Fed. 674.
